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ABSTRACT 
 
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menguji faktor-faktor keperilakuan eksekutif atas perilaku 
pengelolaan laba berkaitan dengan program penawaran opsi saham eksekutif pada 
perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Konsisten dengan Heath 
dan Huddart (1998) bahwa eksekusi terhadap opsi saham eksekutif merupakan respon 
terhadap pergerakan harga saham. Penelitian ini mengirim 75 kuesioner dan kembali 
sebanyak 52, tetapi 2 kuesioner tidak menjawab secara lengkap dan dikeluarkan sebagai 
sampel, sehingga sampel akhir sebanyak 50. Analisis data menggunakan regresi 
berganda terdiri atas 3 (tiga) variabel indepeden dan 1 variabel dependen. Hasil 
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa nilai opsi saham dan desain kompensasi menjadi faktor 
yang dipertimbangkan manajer untuk melakukan pengelolaan laba, namun tidak 
demikian untuk faktor pengukuran kinerja. Semakin besar nilai kompensasi yang 
diterima, semakin besar kemungkinan manajer melakukan pengelolaan laba. Sebagai 
tambahan, kompensasi jangka panjang menunjukkan desain penghargaan kepada para 
eksekutif yang memiliki kemampuan dan loyalitas yang tinggi, sehingga mengikat untuk 
jangka waktu panjang melalui opsi saham eksekutif. Hal tersebut semakin memotivasi 
eksekutif untuk meningkatkan kinerja mereka melalui pengelolan laba karena untung 
diperoleh dari perbedaan antara harga pasar pada saat jatuh tempo dengan harga 
eksekusi pada tanggal hibah. 
 
Kata kunci: Program Opsi Saham Karyawan, Eksekusi, Nilai Opsi Saham, Desain 
Kompensasi, Pengukuran Kinerja. 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding 
incentives, contracts and organizations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very 
narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. Contract theory or 
principal-agent theory, for example, typically restrict their attention to the motives to 
achieve income through effort and to avoid risks.  
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An executive stock option program (ESOP) compensation give management a right to 
purchase a certain number of shares in the future at a specified price determined at the 
time the options are offered before expired date, during the employees still become 
company employees. Executive stock options are call options given by employing firms to 
their employees in compensation for labor services.  Typically, at the time an option is 
granted, its strike price is set equal the firm's concurrent stock price.  Usually, during the first 
portion of its life (the vesting period), the employee cannot exercise his options and in fact 
must forfeit them should he be fired or voluntarily resign. After the vesting date, typically 
three years after the grant date, the executive can exercise his options at any time until 
maturity (usually seven years after the vesting date) but cannot sell or otherwise transfer 
them. Indeed, if he leaves the firm during this period, he is usually forced to choose between 
forfeiting or exercising his options within a short time after his departure.  
 
Psychological problems of human resources within the business entity to get serious 
attention today. The condition can be understood as human resources is an asset that is 
very economical, but it is unique. Stored therein various potentials that require specific 
techniques to explore the sometimes different from the others. One of potential problem 
in agency theory is agency problems that arise between the management (as agent) by the 
shareholders (as principals), between superior and subordinate, and also between 
management and bondholders (bond holder). Each policy will trigger a psychological 
reaction from the parties who use the information or the parties that have control flow. 
They will consider everything, to make inferences and tend to act if profitable. This 
phenomenon encourages the parties that have authorized (agents and principals) to 
develop behavioral approach (Heath and Huddart, 1998). 
 
One class of behavioral theories (belief) would predict that option holders will exercise in 
response to recent stock returns. Belief-based models of investor behavior have received 
increasing attention in the finance literature over the last few years. Research in 
psychology has indicated that individuals sometimes expect trends to continue and 
sometimes expect mean-reversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1971). A second class of behavioral models (values) emphasizes that the 
values of options holders may change depending on whether they are above or below a 
reference point. 
 
Yermack (1997) examines the stock returns around 620 stock option awards between 
1992 and 1994. He interprets these result as devidence that executives opportunistically 
time awards to occur before anticipated stock price increases. Chauvin and Shenoy (2000) 
examine the cumulative abnormal returns before stock option grants and suggest that 
executives benefit from stock price decreases before the stock option grants and stock 
price increases after the grants. The belief that managers and directors should be 
compensated in stock and stock options in order to create high-powered incentives for 
them to maximize share value follows naturally from the approach of using the 
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economists' model of human behavior to analyze corporate governance questions 
(Hartono, 1997). Economic analysis is based on a set of assumptions about the way 
people work in groups. In particular, part of the conventional wisdom has been that 
directors and managers of companies will always make decisions in ways that serve their 
own personal interests unless they are either tightly monitored and constrained (which is 
costly, and raises the question of who will monitor the monitors), or given very strong 
incentives to manage in the interests of shareholders (Antle and Smith, 1986). This 
premise about the way the world works has led to a small industry of compensation 
consultants who have advised firms to pay corporate executives and directors in stock 
options, so that they would be highly motivated to get the company's stock  price  to go 
up in the next period (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). 
 
The problem has been that stock options, as discussed above, create skewed incentives for 
executives - option holders win big if the stock goes up, but they are not penalized if the 
stock price goes down. Furthermore, the models used by the compensation consultants 
often provide that if the stock price goes down, then options should be repriced, or 
executives should be awarded a large number of additional options (with a lower strike 
price) so that they will again be well-motivated to get the stock price to go up from 
wherever it is at the time. 
 
As a new program, research on ESOP becomes very important to know how developed 
ESOP phenomenon in Indonesia. This study has several motivations are to give 
foundation that provides the basis for research in the field of financial accounting related 
to the ESOP in Indonesia. Further motivation, namely to expand research in the field of 
ESOP and to obtain empirical evidence of benefits of ESOP to the company. Asyik 
(2006) found that corporate executives have the competence to control the company's 
profits. By the grant of stock options (exposure) of the executive management of the 
company has made earnings management by lowering the amount of discretionary 
accruals in order for the company's stock market prices decline. These conditions allow 
them to do because the earnings information is used, both the investors and potential as 
an indicator to assess the company in relation to the stock price prediction. Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Beaver and Engel (1996) empirically proved that the company's 
earnings information was responded positively by investors in the New York Stock 
Exchange. 
 
There are a number of behavioral factors of ESOP offering that cause earnings 
management behavior by the executive. Heath and Huddard (1998) states the opinion of 
the direction of the behavioral models of values that the value of stock options may 
change the behavior of managers (and hence change the behavior of risk) depends on 
whether the value is above or below what they wanted. Adli (2001) also revealed that the 
design of incentive compensation is not limited to cash compensation and bonus (short-
term compensation), but also the stock compensation (long-term compensation). Types of 
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long-term compensation becomes an important alternative to obtaining the maximum 
gain on market price movements. In addition, Sumirah (1998) also predicts that the 
holders of stock options will be considered a performance measurement system both 
based on internal performance and market based. These factors into consideration by 
executive to take the rights over the stock options and a trigger factor for earnings 
management in order to obtain a favorable difference between the stock price at the 
expired time with  the execution price on the grant date, so that executives can gain 
maximum. 
 
Based on the above background, then the main issues raised in this research is what 
behavioral factors are causing executives to do management earnings for ESOP offering. 
In keeping with the research issues raised, the purpose of this study is to examine the 
behavioral factors that influence the behavior of earnings management by executives 
around offer of the ESOP. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Agency Theory 
 
Research on incentive systems in relation to earnings management has evolved since the 
study conducted Healy (1985) by using the approach to management bonus program. 
Healy assumed that the company consists of a manager who is reluctant to risk and one or 
more owners. Healy uses bonuses formula to managers as follows: 
 
                (1) 
 
in which p is the percentage of bonus payments as stated in the contract bonus, L is the 
lower earnings limit (Et), and U is the upper limit on excess earnings above the lower 
limit (Et - L). In the literature, the lower limit is BOGEY and the upper limit is CAP 
(Scott, 2000). Studies show that managers will not receive bonuses when earnings are 
below the lower limit and receive a bonus of P (Et - L) when the earnings is between 
lower limit and upper limit, and receive a bonus fixed at p U' when earnings exceed the 
upper limit. Research of Healy (1985) is the starting point for further research, especially 
in studies related to the management system of incentives and profit. 
 
Actual agency problem arises when the principal difficulty to ensure that agents act to 
maximize the welfare of the principal. According to agency theory, one of the 
mechanisms that are widely used and is expected to align principal and agent goals is 
through the financial reporting mechanisms. Because of the trend for managers to looking 
for our benefit (moral hazard) and the level of high information asymmetry, plus a certain 
motives, the likelihood of management to utilize accrual items to present the earnings in 
B’t = p {min {U’, max {(Et - L,0}}} 
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accordance with the interests that might not fit with the interests of principals, such as 
owners, holders of shares, or lenders. 
 
Problems that arise in agency relationships by Eisenhard (1989) is the assumption of 
human nature (self interest, Bounded Rationality, and risk aversion), so that the pressure 
in the theory of agency is an organization (the goal conflict among members) and 
information (a commodity which can be purchased). With this human nature, then the 
principal needs to control the agent to do the work in accordance with the delegated 
authority. Control of the agent can be done through monitoring, risk sharing, or both. 
Efforts to minimize or control the agent-principal conflict can be classified into three 
main categories, namely: (1) market discipline, (2) compensation structure, and (3) 
monitoring mechanisms (Traichal et al., 1999). 
 
Various conflicts of interest both among managers with shareholders, managers with 
creditors or among shareholders, creditors, and managers due to the existence of agency 
relationships (agency relationship). Principal Parties may limit the divergence of interests 
by providing a proper level of incentives to the agent and should be willing to pay 
supervision (monitoring cost) to prevent the hazard from the agent. Such characteristics 
are often referred to as agency costs (agency costs). In general, it is impossible for a 
principal or agent, at the level of agency costs at zero, can guarantee that the agent will 
make optimal decisions from the perspective of the principal. 
 
There are several alternatives to reduce conflicts of interest and agency costs. First, 
increase the company's stock ownership by management. This ownership will align 
management interests with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
second alternative, increasing the ratio of dividends to net income (dividend payout ratio), 
thus there is not enough a lot of free cash flow and the management was forced to seek 
external funding sources for investment financing. Definition of free cash flow is the 
availability of funds in the amount that exceeds the need for funding for profitable 
investments. If the profits are divided as dividends, so the investment needs to be sought 
from external funding sources. This external financing will improve oversight by external 
parties such as supervisors of capital markets, investment bankers (investment bankers), 
and investors. 
 
While the last alternative is to increase funding to the debt. Increased debt will reduce the 
scale of the conflict between shareholders and management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
This is understandable because if the company requires a credit, it must be ready to be 
evaluated and monitored by external party and that will reduce conflict between 
management and shareholders. In addition, the debt will also reduce the excess cash flow 
that is in the company, so reducing the possibility of waste management undertaken.  
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Executive Stock Option Plan (ESOP) 
Share optional program is one of the programs involving various human resources in a 
company. This program is widely used in planning and compensation by the companies 
registered at Stock Market. The adoption of share optional program is expected to be able 
to minimize problem of agency as well as to stimulate commitment and control of 
executive employees to company. This program is also expected to increase the value of 
companies through company performance improvement.  
 
As an incentive to appreciate the long-term performance of the company, ESOP is an 
effective step to narrow and reduce the agency problems and agency cost through 
alignment of interest the executives with the shareholders (Brenner et al., 2000). 
Ownership of shares by employees of the company (insiders) to give the impression as a 
financial investment. Ownership will provide a great feeling of satisfaction and 
commitment to the company's control (Klein, 1987; Frech, 1987) in Iqbal and Abdul 
(2000). 
 
ESOP is expected to improve the performance of agents who will be reflected in the 
earnings information that is often called the accounting earnings. Expectations are not 
excessive because the theoretical equity-based compensation will indirectly consider 
existence of labor, so that in the long run, companies will have employees who are 
generally qualified and holds proprietary concepts in carrying out the duties of the 
company. 
 
Implementation of compensation system is expected to be able to attract and retain 
competent employees, as well as management decisions relating to the maximization of 
shareholder wealth value. Empirical evidence shows that management performance, as 
measured by the wealth of shareholders, related positively and strongly with management 
compensation (Murphy, 1985), although the change in management wealth is very small 
compared with changes in shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Compensation 
program is intended to encourage management to maximize the value that reflected the 
company's profitability or stock price. In addition, management compensation program is 
also intended to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and management, because 
the company's value maximization efforts (through the compensation program) is also an 
effort to increase the management welfare. Further associated with the outcome or 
performance that management obtained, then the payment package design of corporate 
executives (corporate executive pay package) can be determined in an effort to reduce 
agency costs between shareholders and managers (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). 
 
Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) states that compensation contracts motivate corporate 
executives, so that the executive compensation program should be competitive enough to 
attract and retain high quality managers, linking bonuses to performance, and able to 
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develop performance-oriented climate within the company by giving rewards to 
performance assessed well. 
 
Studies on Earnings Management 
Healy (1985) states that asymmetric information between investors and management give 
an opportunity to companies to make earnings management. This resulted in the 
emergence of the information gap between the company management with the users of 
financial statements and open opportunity to do window dressing valid through accrual 
policy settings. In this case, the agency theory states that the contract between agent and 
principal, which involves two parties are equally encouraged to benefit themselves, will 
result in conflict.  
 
The emergence of earnings management behavior is driven by changes in corporate 
control. The Company consists of management (agents) who are appointed or given 
delegation by shareholders (principals) to make decisions, they try to maximize utility, 
but management has more opportunities to maximize utility.  
 
Studies on earnings management in particular examine situations in which the conflicting 
parties have the incentive to monitor (adjust) accounting numbers (in the form of 
manipulation). Studies estimate the discretionary component of total accruals is used as a 
measure of earnings management. Policy components in total accruals is more 
appropriate in this context, given the public the company seems more interested in 
earnings before tax that includes all the effects of accrual accounts, and some of them are 
used to measure earnings. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) states that companies that base 
compensation on the basis of earnings has incentive to set the earnings in order to 
maximize their own interests by selecting accounting policies that increase profits.  
 
Cahan (1992), Naim and Hartono (1996), and Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) to evaluate 
earnings management using categorical variables (dummy) to see whether the factor 
(which allegedly is) triggered earnings management is correlated with the level of 
discretionary accruals. 
 
Hypotheses about Factors which impact Eanings Management for offering 
Executive Stock Option Plan (ESOP)  
 
There are several reasons underlying the impact of ESOP on earnings management. First, 
the structure of compensation may provide incentives to manage earnings and EPS. Healy 
(1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995) showed that managers try to manage earnings to 
maximize the present value (present value) bonus payments. Second, EPS is an important 
factor to evaluate the performance and appraisal companies. Companies often focus on 
EPS and EPS growth in their annual reports to shareholders. 
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Gao and Shrieves (2002) examine empirically whether the design of compensation 
contracts consisting of stock options and stock bonuses and restricted affect the intensity 
of earnings management. Results showed that the influence of some components of 
compensation largely predictable on allegations that managers behave in an opportunistic. 
Thus indicated that by offering stock options, top management was trying to do earnings 
management. 
 
Earnings management is effective in influence stock prices, executive action should be 
communicated to the financial markets such as the announcement of earnings or other 
voluntary disclosures. If managers are able to influence the structure of compensation 
contracts, research expects managers will receive grants of stock options immediately 
prior to the good news pushed the stock price increases. In other words, executives can 
increase the value of their option to receive an option on the date when the company's 
stock price is relatively low. Previous studies found that the negative abnormal stock 
returns before the offer of grants of stock options and positive after the grant offer stock 
options (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2000). Stock 
return patterns around offering stock options is consistent with opportunistic behavior of 
executives who aims to increase the value of their options. 
 
Based on these conditions, the research modifiy hypothesis by considering behavioral 
factors that influence earnings management actions on the ESOP bid. Heath and Huddard 
(1998) states the opinion of the direction of the behavioral models of values that the value 
of stock options may change the behavior of managers (and hence change the behavior of 
risk) depends on whether the value is above or below what they wanted. Adli (2001) also 
revealed that the design of incentive compensation is not limited to cash compensation 
and bonus (short-term compensation), but also the stock compensation (long-term 
compensation). Types of long-term compensation becomes an important alternative to 
obtaining the maximum gain on market prices movements. In addition, Sumirah (1998) 
also predicts that the holders of stock options will be considered a performance 
measurement system both based on internal performance and market based. These factors 
into a basic consideration by executive to take the rights over the stock options and a 
trigger factor for earnings management in order to obtain a favorable difference between 
the stock price at the expired time with the execution price on the grant date, so that 
executives can gain maximum. 
 
Therefore, an operational hypotheses in an alternative hypotheses is advanced of follows: 
H1: Value of executive stock options affect the behavior of the executive to make 
earnings management. 
H2: Design of executive compensation affect the behavior of executives to make 
earnings management. 
H3: Executive performance measurement systems influence executive behavior for 
earnings management. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
  
Data and Sample 
 
This study sent 75 questionnaires that the contents were addressed to the executive. 
Questionnaires sent through the electronic facility based corporate secretary email 
address of each company has to offer ESOP. ESOP implementation of the sensitivity tests 
done by comparing the pattern of executive behavior, as was done Asyik (2007) by 
spreading the questionnaire is door to door to each company. Based on questionnaires 
sent, only 52 are sent back questionnaires and answers, but as many as 2 incomplete 
questionnaire data that was issued as a sample, so the final sample is 50. 
 
Variable and Operational Definition 
 
Dependen variable is discretionary accrual that estimated using modified Jone’s model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) to measure earnings management level. Based on the model of 
Healy (1985), Jones (1991) introduced the model to separate discretionary accruals from 
the accrual nondiscretionary. In this study, discretionary accruals will measured use: (1) 
accruals estimation models used Jones (1991) and (2) the average accrual whole 
observation. 
 
DAit = TAit-1/Ait-1–[a1(1/Ait-1)+b2(∆REVit-∆RECit/Ait-1)+b3(PPEit/Ait-1)]        (2)    
 
in the above equation, Dait is the discretionary accrual firm i at period t. ΔREVit is the 
company's revenue firm i at period t, ΔRECit is the company's accounts receivable firm i 
in period t minus the company's accounts receivable in the period t-1, PPEit  is the 
company's fixed assets firm i at period t, εit is the residual error firm i at period t. 
 
Independen variable of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are stock option value, compensation 
design, and performance measurement. 
(1) The value of stock options. Heath and Huddard (1998) states that the value of stock 
options may change the behavior of managers (and hence change the behavior of 
risk) depends on whether the value is above or below what they wanted. Variable of 
stock options value is measured using a Heath and Huddart’s questionnaire (1998) 
with modification and using 5-point scale with the lowest score (point 1) showed 
very little success, being the highest score (points 5) showed very satisfactory.  
(2) Compensation Design. Adli (2001) reveals that compensation incentives are not 
limited to cash compensation and bonus (short-term compensation), but also the 
stock compensation (long-term compensation). Variable of compensation design is 
measured using a Adli’s questionnaire (2001) with modification and using 5-point 
scale with the lowest score (point 1) indicates strongly disagree, being the highest 
score (points 5) indicates strongly agree. 
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(3) Performance Measurement. Sumirah (1998) predicts that the holders of stock 
options will be considered a good performance measurement system based on 
internal performance and market based. Variable of Performance measurement 
measured using Sumirah’s questionnaires (1998) with modification and using 5-
point scale with the lowest score (point 1) shows ever, was the highest score (points 
5) shows very often/always.  
 
While variable of earnings management measured on a scale 5 points with the score 
lowest (point 1) shows no role, being the highest score (points 5) showed a full role.  
 
Method of Analysis  
 
This research utilises primary analysis tool is multiple linear regression and to examine 
influence of behavioral factors for stock option grant proportion on discretionary 
accruals, specification of research model as follow: 
 
Research Model: 
 
DA(it) = β0+β1SOVit+β2CDit+β3PMit+εit                     (3) 
 
where DA(it) is discretionary accruals, SOVit is stock option value, CDit is compensation 
design, PMit is performance measurement, εit is error.  
                                                            
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables for the sample as a whole to test 
the behavior of earnings management over offering employees stock options.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Research Variable 
 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
 DA 50 3,535 0,717 1,970 4,630 
 SOV 50 2,085 0,552 1,030 2,960 
 CD 50   -0,657 0,175    -0,980      -0,350 
  PM 50 0,973 0,273     0,500 1,440 
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Description:  
AD = Accrual Discretionary, SOV = Stock Option Value, CD = Compensation Design, 
PM = Performance Measurement 
 
Average data and standard deviation are used to determine the fluctuations of each 
variable tested, being the minimum and maximum data shows ranging (range) of normal 
data to avoid biased results. Standard deviation of all the variables are relatively small in 
value, it shows that earnings management behavior of firms in the sample relating to 
employee stock option programs are not too varied. Standard deviation values are not too 
large it also shows that the distortion level of each variable is not significant. 
 
Test of Validity and Reliability 
 
Associated with earnings management behavior of managers for offer stock options, the 
research done by doing a sensitivity test with digging behavioral factors making these 
stock options. Behavioral factors making the stock options referred to Heath and Huddart 
(1998), Sumirah (1998), and Adli (2001). Behavioral factors used in this study are: (1) 
value of stock options, (2) the design of compensation, and (3) performance 
measurement. Indicated these factors affect the behavior of managers to do earnings 
management on offering stock options. 
 
Test of validity 
 
Validity test is intended to measure the extent to which instruments are used actually 
measure what is supposed to be measured. To test the validity of this study used factor 
analysis. Variables are expected to have an MSA value (Measures of Sampling 
Adequacy) above 50, so that the data collected can be said right to factor analysis, and 
also indicating the construct validity of each variable. 
 
Test of Reliability 
 
Reliability test is intended to measure the instruments used completely free of error, 
which is expected to produce consistent results. In this study, reliability of questionnaire 
instruments tested using the coefficient values of cronbach alpha. These variables can be 
said reliable if cronbach alpha has a value greater than 60.  
 
Test results are presented in Table 2 shows that the research instruments used in this 
study quite reliable and valid. Test results showed that the value of the MSA and loading 
value to the overall number of variables used in over 50% so it can be concluded that all 
the variables is valid.  
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Table 2 
Validity and Reliability Test 
 
Variable RELIABILITY VALIDITY 
Alpha Cronbach MSA LOADING 
DA 
SOV 
CD 
PM 
0,754 (Andal) 
0,762 (Andal) 
0,813 (Andal) 
0,606 (Andal) 
0,650 
0,755 
0,677 
0,626 
0,509 - 0,768 
0,500 - 0,825 
0,557 - 0,799 
0,500 - 0,775 
Description:  
AD = Accrual Discretionary, SOV = Stock Option Value, CD = Compensation Design, 
PM = Performance Measurement 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Hypothesis testing is intended to examine the factors that affect managers to do earnings 
management associated with stock options. Table 3 presents the analysis  of  the  
behavioral factors making stock options on earnings management. 
 
Table 3 
Regression Result of Questionnaire Test 
DA(it) = β0+β1SOVit+β2CDit+β3PMit+εit  
 
Variable Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
 
   Intercept 
   SOV 
   CD 
   PM 
  
   R2 (Adjusted) 
   F 
 
3,351 
0,501 
1,820 
0,346 
 
0,495 (0,196) 
4,974 *** 
 
  6,442 
  2,848 
  3,263 
  1,021 
 
 
         0,000 
    0,007 *** 
         0,002 *** 
         0,313 
 
 
Description:  
AD = Accrual Discretionary, SOV = Stock Option Value, CD = Compensation Design, 
PM = Performance Measurement 
*** The statistical significant at the 0.01 level  
   ** The statistical significant at the 0.05 level  
     * The statistical significant at the 0.10 level 
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F value is 4.974 with a value of probability = 0.005, thus a statistical significant at 1%. 
The amount of R2 is 0.495, which means that the variations in the level of earnings 
management is described by behavioral factors making stock options for 49.5%. The 
remaining 50.5% described other variables that are not included in the research model.  
 
The results of the analysis in Table 3 shows that the coefficient SOV (β1) is 0.501 with a 
p-value of 0.007, it is statistical significant at 1% level.  Besides, the coefficient CD (β2) 
is 1.820 with a p-value of 0.002, it is also statistical significant at 1% level.  The latter 
coefficient PM ((β2) with a p-value of 0.313 was not significant in statistical.  
 
The results showed that the value of options and design of compensation to be considered 
for the manager to manage earnings. The greater the value of compensation received, the 
more likely managers do earnings management. This shows that the more stock options 
offered to employees with a relatively high value, the more managers are motivated to do 
earnings management. The results of this study are consistent with previous studies of the 
behavior of managers who expect the amount received stock options so that a relatively 
large gain to be obtained is also growing. 
 
This condition is further supported by the positive price movement increasingly rising. 
Thus, this study successfully reject H01. This research is consistent with Heath and 
Huddard (1998), Chauvin & Shenoy (2000), Baker et al., (2002), and Balsam et al., 
(2003). In addition, long-term compensation design suggests that the awards to executives 
who have the capability and high loyalty, so that the binding for a period through the 
ESOP will increasingly motivate executives to increase their performance, so the higher 
difference between the market price at maturity execution with price on the grant date 
indicates the actual gain will be obtained by the executive. Thus, this study successfully 
reject H02. The results are consistent with previous studies that the company is offering 
compensation in the form of ESOP will have a greater motivation to do earnings 
management in order to earn large gain on the difference between the price of making 
stock options with stock market prices (Yermack, 1997; Adli, 2001 ; Gao & Shrieves, 
2002). 
The results showed that performance measurement does not prove to be the underlying 
factor to earnings management by executives associated with the ESOP. This is because 
the actual performance measurement conducted at the new stock option maturity, and 
performance measurement during the vesting period is only a prediction performance 
measurement, it is less desirable by the executive (AICPA, 1972). Similarly, the Financial 
Accounting Standards through the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (PSAK) 
No. 53, the measurement of stock options offered to employees in exchange for employee 
services have clearly measured and recognized at fair value of stock options (IAI, 2001). 
Fair value of stock options estimated by public companies using the model option awards 
including the Black Scholes model or binomial model (FASB, 1995).   
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The model requires companies award options to make some estimations of them: (1) 
period of expected stock options, (2) volatility of expected stock price, (3) expected risk-
free interest rate, and (4) expected dividend yield. When estimating these factors affect 
the fair value of stock options (hereafter affect the amount of monetary options), 
companies can reduce the number of dollars of stock options to regulate these factors 
(Johnston-Wilson, 2003). Based on the fair value approach to stock-based compensation, 
the company estimates the fair value of stock options at grant date using a model of 
option awards, such as the Black-Scholes or binomial model.  
 
In this model, the fair value of stock options is determined as a function of increasing 
(increasing function) on the variables of price volatility and risk-free rate, and a 
decreasing function (decreasing function) on the dividend yield variable. When the 
number of dollars of stock options is based on the fair value of stock options, price 
volatility and risk free rates are much lower estimated (underestimated) and the estimated 
dividend yield is higher (overestimated) causes the number of dollars of compensation 
based on estimated shares would be lower. Thus, companies can reduce the number of 
dollars of stock options is reflected in accounting profit by adjusting the model factors 
such option awards. Thus, this study successfully reject H03. The results are consistent 
with previous studies, especially about the option awards model factors (Johnston-
Wilson, 2003). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS,  
LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
Conclusions and Discussions 
 
The results showed that the value of option and design of compensation to be considered 
for the manager to manage earnings. The greater the value of compensation received, the 
more likely managers do earnings management. This shows that the more stock options 
offered to employees with a relatively high value, the more managers are motivated to do 
earnings management.  
 
In addition, long-term compensation design suggests that the awards to executives who 
have the capability and high loyalty, so that the binding for a period through the ESOP 
will increasingly motivate executives to increase their performance, so the higher 
difference between the market price at maturity execution price with the grant date 
indicates the actual gain will be obtained by the executive. 
 
Implication Result of Research 
This Research answer issue that employee stock option program can become manager 
determinant do earnings management. Thereby result of research of consistence with 
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problem of agency that is existence of conflict of interest between manager with 
shareholder. Pursuant to finding that management manage the date of financial statement 
publication and date of offer of stock option can give consideration at circle of regulator 
in specifying regulation which related to stock exchange, specially regarding information 
disclosure.  
 
Limitation of Resarch 
 
This Research only considering long-range stock-based compensation variable in its 
bearing with behavior of management to manage earnings because influenced by 
difficulty of researcher get data concerning short-term compensation and non physical 
compensation.  
 
Research sample consist of executives who receive compensation in the form of ESOP 
and the questionnaire was sent via electronic facilities to send an email to the corporate 
secretary of each company that offers ESOP. The results can be biased, because of the 
uncertainty of respondents who answered whether the executive actually receiving ESOP 
or not. However, this study tried to provide additional information related to the data has 
been collected in the year 2004 namely data collection with door to door method to each 
company (pick-up ball method). The results obtained (Asyik, 2007) in line with the 
results of this research. 
 
Despitefully, this research do not base election of research sampel pursuant to offer of 
stock option at is same period, however select research sampel each phase as according to 
period when company apply ESOP. Additional test regarding examination of behavioral 
factors in its bearing with exercise of stock option use compiled kuesioner byself by 
researcher so that still need furthermore verification as according to condition in 
Indonesia. 
 
Suggestion 
  
Examination with perception which is longer to be expected to get research sampel which 
quite a lot and give result of better. Despitefully, next research can test obtained research 
sampel pursuant to is same period to know do there is difference of behavior of earnings 
management relate to stock option, so that can be obtained by comparison with 
examination use research sampel pursuant to period when company start to apply stock 
option program.  
 
In addition, subsequent research should consider methods of data collection that is not 
biased, for example using the appropriate respondents. 
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